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Employing a discourse analytic approach, this paper examines the silence on state 
terrorism within the broader terrorism studies literature. An analysis of this 
literature reveals that state terrorism is noticeable mainly for its absence as a 
subject of systematic academic study. Following the textual analysis, the main 
finding – the silence on state terrorism within terrorism studies – is subjected to 
both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a 
discourse‟s internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to criticise it on 
its own terms. In this case, the absence of state terrorism is criticized for its 
illogical actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus, 
and its failure to acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent and nature of 
state terrorism. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political 
and ethical consequences of the representations enabled by the discourse. It is 
argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions to 
promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimizing 
public discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the 
terroristic practices of states. The exposure and destabilisation of this dominant 
narrative also opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and 
potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. 
 
 
Introduction 
Terrorism studies, once a fairly minor sub-field of security studies, has rapidly expanded to 
become a stand-alone field with its own dedicated journals, research centres, leading scholars 
and experts, canon of published works, research funding opportunities, conferences, 
seminars, and study programmes. A perennial criticism of the field‟s voluminous output 
however, has been the neglect of „state terrorism‟ as a subject for systematic and sustained 
research,
2
 a problem noted during the Cold War but which seems to have become even more 
acute since September, 2001 (see Blakeley 2007, Zulaika and Douglass 1996, George 1991; 
Herman and O‟Sullivan 1989, Herman 1982). To many observers this neglect is somewhat 
puzzling given that the genealogy of the term „terrorism‟ has its earliest roots in the 
deployment of violence by states to terrify and intimidate civilian populations, states have 
employed terrorism far more extensively than non-state actors over the past two centuries, 
state terrorism is far more lethal and destructive than non-state terrorism, and the employment 
of terror against civilians by states continues unabated in a great many countries today. 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore this puzzle broadly through the prism of 
discourse analysis, a form of critical theorising aimed in part at understanding and describing 
the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics. Taking as its starting point that 
                                                          
1
 Another version of this paper has recently been published as: Richard Jackson, 2008. „The ghosts of state 
terror: knowledge, politics and terrorism studies‟, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1(3): 377-392 [copyright 
Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=g906444577~db=all]. 
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 This is not to say that state violence and repression has not been studied, but rather that it has not been 
systematically studied under the rubric of „terrorism‟ or by recognised terrorism studies scholars. 
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knowledge and its production is never a purely neutral exercise but always works for 
someone and for something, this paper seeks to excavate the ideological effects of the 
discourse on state terrorism (or, more accurately, the silence within the discourse) in the 
terrorism studies field. It argues that the way in which state terrorism is constructed as a 
(non)subject both distorts the field as an area of scholarly research, and more importantly, 
reifies dominant structures of power and enables particular kinds of elite and state hegemonic 
projects. 
 
Analysing the discourse of state terrorism 
The analytical approach employed in this study falls under the mantle of discourse analysis 
(see Miliken 1999, Laffey and Weldes 1997, Purvis and Hunt 1993, Yee 1996), as employed 
within a broadly social constructivist framework. A form of critical theorising, discourse 
analysis aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and social 
and political processes. In particular, it is concerned with the politics of representation – the 
manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another. In this case, I am concerned with the ways in which state terrorism is represented – 
or not represented, which is itself a kind of representation – as a subject within the field of 
terrorism studies. Discourse theorising is predicated on a number of theoretical commitments, 
including, among others: an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of 
meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which help to construct 
social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational 
positions within a system of signification (see for example, Doty 1993); an understanding of 
discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate forms of 
knowledge and political practices, and importantly, common sense within particular social 
groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and 
silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically 
and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-
articulation and therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle (Milliken 
1999). 
On this epistemological foundation, the discourse analytic technique employed in this 
paper proceeded in two main stages. The first stage entailed a close examination of a large 
number of texts from within the terrorism studies field.
3
 As such, the primary units of 
analysis or „data‟ for this research were more than 100 mainstream academic books, articles 
in the main terrorism studies and international relations journals, conference papers presented 
at the ISA and APSA conventions, and reports and websites from think-tanks and research 
institutions. Each text was examined initially to see if it contained the terms „state terrorism‟ 
or „state terror‟. Texts that did contain these terms were then examined to see how they were 
constructed as a discursive formation and subject of knowledge, how they were deployed 
within broader narratives, and how state terrorism was positioned as a subject in relation to 
non-state terrorism. Employing a „grounded theory‟ approach, the analysis was considered 
complete when the addition of new texts did not yield any new insights or categories. 
The second stage of the research involved subjecting the findings of the textual 
analysis to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a 
discourse‟s internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions, and omissions to criticise it on 
its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge 
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 A great deal of my previous research has involved a discourse analysis of texts from the terrorism studies field. 
For this paper, I re-examined many of these texts, as well as a number of new texts. Previous discourse analytic 
studies which broadly support the findings in this paper include, among others: Jackson 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2005.  
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or address. The point of this form of internal critique is not necessarily to establish the 
„correct‟ or „real truth‟ of the subject beyond doubt, but rather to destabilise dominant 
interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse.  
A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical 
consequences – the ideological effects – of the representations and more importantly in this 
case, the silences, enabled by the discourse. Specifically, it involves an exploration of the 
ways in which the discourse functions as a „symbolic technology‟ (Laffey and Weldes 1997) 
that can be wielded by particular elites and institutions, to: structure the primary subject 
positions, accepted knowledge, commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors 
and events being described; exclude and de-legitimise alternative knowledge and practice; 
naturalise a particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic 
regime of truth. A range of specific discourse analytic techniques are useful in second order 
critique: genealogical analysis, predicate analysis, narrative analysis, and deconstructive 
analysis (see Milliken 1999, p. 306). 
It is crucial to recognise that discourses are significant not just for what they say but 
also for what they do not say; the silences in a discourse can be as important, or even more 
important at times, than what is stated. This is because silence can function ideologically in 
any number of ways. For example, silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or 
misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-
legitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular 
kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining 
process directed against certain actors – among others. In other words, the silences within a 
text often function as an exercise in power; revealing and interrogating those silences 
therefore, is an important part of first and second order critique. 
Lastly, it is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a broad form of 
knowledge and practice, it is never completely uniform, coherent, or consistent; it always has 
porous borders and often contains multiple exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by 
different speakers and texts. Many of the terrorism scholars discussed in this paper for 
example, upon a close reading of their individual texts, often express more nuanced 
arguments than are necessarily presented here. The important point is not that each text or 
scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way, or even that these scholars agree on a 
broad set of knowledge claims. It is rather, that taken together as an overall social discourse 
and a body of work that has political and cultural currency, the narratives and forms of the 
discourse function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, 
„terrorism‟ and „state terrorism‟ and that this knowledge has certain political and social 
effects. 
 
The ghosts of state terror in terrorism studies 
I refer to the „ghosts‟ of state terrorism because even though the main finding of my discourse 
analysis is that state terrorism is largely missing as a subject from the broader terrorism 
literature, its ghostly outline can still be detected in a variety of forms. For example, it is 
something of a cliché to note that the term „terror‟ from which „terrorism‟ derives was first 
used to describe revolutionary counter-violence by the French state, was employed by the 
Nuremberg prosecutors to condemn Nazi actions and forms of rule in Europe, and was used 
by historians to describe Soviet governance during the reign of Joseph Stalin. It has also been 
noted that the term shares the same Latin root as the term „territory‟ and that the fear (terror) 
of state violence has a central place in the emergence and dominance of the modern state and 
Western political theory (see Hindess 2006, Robin 2004). The term therefore contains within 
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itself the discursive echoes of state violence, despite its more recently constructed meaning as 
a descriptor for non-state actions and behaviour.   
In addition to this genealogical trace, a discourse analysis of the field reveals that 
there are a great many prominent scholars who acknowledge in passing that terrorism is a 
strategy of political violence which any actor can employ, including states, but then do not 
examine cases of state terrorism in any systematic or sustained manner in their own research. 
Walter Laqueur, arguably one of the founders of terrorism studies, is emblematic of this 
practice: he openly accepts that states have killed many more people and caused far more 
material and social destruction than „terrorism from below‟, but then argues that this is 
simply not the terrorism he wishes to examine (Laqueur 1997, p. 6). Similarly, Paul 
Wilkinson, perhaps the most well-known scholar in the field notes: „if we are to gain an 
adequate understanding of the broader historical and international trends we need to 
recognize throughout history it is regimes and states, with their overwhelming propensity of 
coercive power, which have shown the greatest propensity for terror on a mass scale, both as 
an instrument of internal repression and control, and as a weapon of aggression and 
subjugation‟ (Wilkinson 2001, p. 41). However, like Laqueur, Brian Jenkins, and the vast 
majority of terrorism studies scholars, Wilkinson has not, to date, studied state terrorism 
systematically, but instead focused the vast majority of his work on non-state forms of 
terrorism. As Sam Raphael has recently demonstrated, this same approach characterises a 
significant proportion of the most widely cited and well-known terrorism scholars – the 
recognised „terrorism experts‟ (Raphael 2007). 
This is not to say that state terrorism is not studied at all in the broader literature; there 
is a relatively small but important body of research on the subject (see for example, Stohl 
2006, Becker 2006, Blakeley 2006, Grosscup 2006, Gareau 2004, Sluka 2000a, George 1991, 
Stohl and Lopez 1986, 1984, Herman 1982) – as well as large related literatures on 
repression, genocide, torture, and the like. However, the state terrorism literature is 
numerically tiny compared to the many thousands of publications on non-state terrorism. 
More importantly, analyses of author affiliation and the political-scholarly epistemic 
networks they work within (see Reid 1997) demonstrates that the vast majority of state 
terrorism scholars come from disciplines outside of international relations and political 
science, such as anthropology, sociology, and criminology. Furthermore, most are not 
recognised as „terrorism experts‟ by the media or political establishment (few are asked to 
appear in the media or provide expert testimony to political bodies, for example), few publish 
in the recognised terrorism studies journals, and their work is rarely cited in the mainstream 
terrorism studies literature. In other words, these scholars and this literature exist largely on 
the periphery of the terrorism studies field.   
Related to this very small and often invisible section of the broader discourse, there 
are a similarly small number of texts in which state terrorism is given a reasonably systematic 
treatment within the context of a broader treatment of terrorism. For example, there are a 
number of introductory texts in which state terrorism is analysed within a stand-alone chapter 
or section (see for example, Goodin, 2006, Martin 2003, Barker 2002, Townshend 2002). 
However, the important point to note about these texts is that they are mainly introductory in 
nature, they are based on a description of secondary materials rather than the presentation of 
any original research, many of them are written by scholars outside of the orthodox terrorism 
studies field, and the discussion of state terrorism is most often restricted to a single chapter 
in an entire book. In addition, the subject matter of these introductory chapters is frequently 
restricted to topics such as the original terror of the French revolutionary state, state 
sponsorship of non-state terrorist groups, genocide, and case studies of Nazi, Soviet, and 
Latin American state terror (see for example, Martin 2003). Importantly, a discourse analysis 
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of these texts reveals that there are other forms of silence within them, in particular, a deep 
and pervasive silence on Western democratic state terrorism, Israeli state terrorism, and post-
Cold War state terrorism. It is also important to note that a great many more such 
introductory texts do not give any systematic attention to state terrorism at all (see Sloan 
2006). 
 There is one more ghostly outline of state terrorism within the broader field, namely, 
a small but growing literature on so-called „state sponsored terrorism‟. I have analysed 
aspects of this literature in more detail elsewhere (Jackson 2007b). Within these texts, one of 
the most common narratives is that terrorist groups depend upon significant state support to 
survive and active „sponsors‟ provide a range of positive and permissive forms of assistance. 
Gus Martin‟s popular textbook for example, suggests that the state sponsorship of terrorism 
frequently consists of: „ideological support‟, „financial support‟, „military support‟, 
operational support‟, „initiating terrorist attacks‟, or „direct involvement in terrorist attacks‟ 
(Martin 2003, p. 91). Additionally, it is commonly argued that weak, totalitarian, or so-called 
„rogue states‟ are predisposed to sponsoring terrorism because:  
 
[F]or aggressive regimes, state terrorism in the international domain is 
advantageous in several respects: State terrorism is inexpensive… Even poor 
nations can strike at and injure a prosperous adversary… State terrorism has 
limited consequences. State assisters that are clever can distance themselves from 
culpability for a terrorist incident… and thereby escape possible reprisals or other 
penalties. State terrorism can be successful. Weaker states can raise the stakes 
beyond what a stronger adversary is willing to bear… [and] successfully 
destabilize an adversary through the use of a proxy movement. (Martin 2003, pp. 
90-91; original emphasis).   
 
In fact, much of the „state sponsorship‟ literature is devoted to analysing and describing those 
states viewed as the main sponsors of terrorism, the groups they support, and the kinds of 
assistance they provide. The state sponsors identified in the literature more often than not 
coincide with the U.S. State Department‟s annual list of „state sponsors of international 
terrorism,‟ which typically includes countries with which the U.S. has previously had serious 
conflicts, such as Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, Sudan, Libya, and Iraq.
4
 
One of the most important aspects of this discourse is the way in which the key 
narratives still focus on non-state groups and actions as primary and states as secondary 
sponsors and supporters. In other words, there is an implicit sense that states do not commit 
terrorism directly, but they may support non-state groups that do. Certainly, there is little 
acknowledgement that state actions such as the use of strategic bombing, particular forms of 
governance, repression, and counter-terrorism, or the practice of torture for example, can 
sometimes constitute acts of terrorism. Moreover, within this literature there is another 
important silence, namely, the silence on Western democratic sponsorship of non-state 
terrorism: out of dozens of mainstream books and papers which discussed the state 
sponsorship of terrorism, I found only one or two acknowledgements of U.S. sponsorship of 
anti-Castro or Contra terrorism, British sponsorship of loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland, 
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 Another more recent narrative within this literature is that „passive state sponsorship‟ provides support for 
terrorists – that inaction is just as significant as action. Daniel Byman for example, argues that „At times, the 
greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist‟s cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to 
fundraising, or even tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive‟ 
(Byman 2005, p. III). 
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Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorism, Israeli sponsorship of Christian militia terrorism 
in Lebanon, and other such documented cases.   
 Beyond these ghostly traces of state terror however, a discourse analysis of the field 
reveals that the most notable aspect of the state terrorism discourse is its near complete 
absence; there is almost a total silence on the subject within most books, articles, papers, and 
writings in the terrorism studies field today. In the vast majority of the more than 100 texts I 
examined, the terms „state terrorism‟ or „state terror‟ did not even appear, much less form the 
basis for any kind of sustained analyses or discussion. This basic finding, that there is a 
profound silence on state terrorism within the field, is supported by a broader set of findings. 
Andrew Silke for example, found that only 12 or less than two percent of articles from 1990 
to 1999 in the core terrorism studies journals focused on state terrorism (Silke 2004, p. 206), 
a finding that echoes Schmid and Jongman‟s authoritative survey of the field which 
concluded that „There is a conspicuous absence of literature that addresses itself to the much 
more serious problem of state terrorism‟ (Schmid and Jongman 1988, pp. 179-80). Similarly, 
it has been noted that only 12 of the 768 pages in the Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism 
(1997) examined state terrorism in any form (quoted in Goodin, 2006, p. 55). Along the same 
lines, an analysis of John Thakrah‟s popular Dictionary of Terrorism demonstrates that 
reference to, and discussion of, state terrorism makes up less than 8 out of 308 pages 
(Thakrah 2004). Extraordinarily, Thakrah‟s entry on „History of Terrorism‟ does not mention 
a single example of state terrorism (Ibid, pp. 114-120). My own examination of conference 
paper titles and abstracts found that of 113 papers related to terrorism presented at the 2007 
ISA annual convention, only one focused on any aspect of state terrorism; and of 95 papers 
on terrorism at the 2007 APSA annual convention, only 4 focused on aspects of state 
terrorism. We might also note that the wider terrorism studies field does not include statistics 
on state terrorism in any of its recognised data bases, most notably the highly influential 
RAND database (see Burnett and Whyte 2005, RAND 2006).  
 In addition to this silence on the broader subject of state terrorism, we can detect a 
series of other silences. In particular, there is within the terrorism literature virtually no 
mention or analysis of Western state terrorism, the terror of strategic bombing, the terror of 
democratic state torture, Western sponsorship of mostly right-wing terrorist groups, Israeli 
state terrorism, and the terrorism of Western allies during the Cold War and the war on terror 
– among others. In much contemporary terrorism studies publications, there is an ongoing 
silence on the terrorism of state-sponsored death squads in Iraq, the terrorism of Western-
backed warlords in Afghanistan, and the state terror of Western allies such as Uzbekistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the like. 
In large part, the silence on state terrorism in the discourse is due to the frequent 
practice by terrorism scholars of defining terrorism exclusively as a form of non-state 
violence, thereby excluding states a priori from being able to employ terrorism at all. Bruce 
Hoffman, for example, argues that terrorism involves violence „perpetrated by a subnational 
group or non-state entity‟ (Hoffman 1998, p. 43). This is in keeping with the U.S. State 
Department‟s highly influential definition of terrorism, a definition employed by a significant 
proportion of terrorism scholars today, which conceives of terrorism as „premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience‟ (quoted in Martin 
2003, p. 33). For the many scholars who adopt this definition, terrorism is both largely 
indistinguishable from insurgency, militancy, guerrilla warfare, and the like, and more 
importantly, states are a priori and by definition excluded as actors who can practice 
terrorism. For these scholars, state violence that is intended to cause terror and intimidate 
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may be described as repression, oppression, human rights abuses, war crimes and the like, but 
never as „terrorism‟.  
A related strategy has been to try and exclude state terrorism from research by arguing 
that even if state terrorism does exist, state „terror‟ is qualitatively different from (non-state) 
„terrorism‟ because it has different aims, different means, and it is employed by an actor 
which has the legitimate right to use violence and who is bound by established rules and 
norms relating to the use of such violence. Bruce Hoffman for example, makes the terror-
terrorism distinction, arguing that there „is a fundamental qualitative difference between the 
two types of violence‟ (Hoffman 1998, p. 34). This approach characterises a number of key 
terrorism scholars, including the paradoxical figure of Walter Laqueur, whose work 
subsequently treats state terrorism as largely irrelevant to the study of terrorism as a 
phenomenon.  
In sum, a discourse analysis of the terrorism studies field demonstrates that as a 
subject of discussion and analysis, state terrorism appears most often as a powerful and 
notable silence, but also at times as a ghostly, indistinct outline. Within that broader silence, 
moreover, there are other silences too, most notably on cases of Western involvement in and 
practices of terrorism. 
 
Critical reflections on the ghosts of state terror 
The relative silence on state terrorism within the broader terrorism studies discourse is 
susceptible to both a first and second order critique. A first order critique reveals that the 
discourse is predicated on a number of highly problematic and contestable set of assumptions 
and knowledge practices, while a second order critique exposes the ways in which the 
discourse functions politically to naturalise and legitimise particular forms of knowledge and 
political practices. 
 
First order critique 
Employing the same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology, and empirical 
categories used by terrorism studies scholars, there are a number of key criticisms to be made 
against the silence on state terrorism within the broader terrorism studies discourse. In the 
first place, the actor-based definition of terrorism which excludes states from employing 
terrorism is not only intellectually untenable, it is absurd. Given that terrorism is a violent 
tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes no sense to argue that certain 
actors are precluded by their identity from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A 
bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is 
aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience for a political reason is an act of terrorism 
regardless of whether it is planted by non-state actors or state agents. 
However, it is not the many obvious cases of civilian-directed bombings, kidnappings, 
or assassinations by state agents which are most hotly disputed, although it is still puzzling 
how little studied such events are in the literature, and how they are considered to be 
examples of „repression‟ by many scholars and not „terrorism‟ despite their identical 
characteristics to non-state acts of terror.
5
 Rather, the question is whether or not certain 
broader state actions and modes of governance can or should be called „terrorism‟. I would 
argue that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians 
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 There are numerous examples of state agents being directly involved in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, 
and the like. Obvious cases include the bomb placed on a Korean Airlines flight from Baghdad to Seoul in 1987 
by two North Korean agents that killed all 115 persons on board, and the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 by Libyan 
agents (see Hoffman 1998, p. 190). In other cases, state agents have planted bombs in so-called „black flag 
operations‟ which aim to implicate non-state groups as the perpetrators.  
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which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons – a broadly 
consensual definition of terrorism in the literature (see Raphael 2007) – then states can 
clearly be terrorists too. For example, when government agents attempt to cause fear and 
intimidation to sectors of their own population in order to undermine support for an 
opposition movement through a violent campaign that involves random murder, kidnapping 
and torture, assassination, and bombs planted in public places (the very same acts that non-
state terrorists commit), there is no doubt that in analytical terms, this constitutes terrorism. It 
is similarly terrorism if they attempt to intimidate the population of another state through the 
same means.  
More importantly, employing this understanding of terrorism – as the threat or use of 
violence against one group of people in order to terrify or intimidate another group of people 
as a means of preventing or changing their political behaviour – it becomes clear that a 
number of other state actions can also qualify as „terrorism‟. For example, when torture is 
widely employed by the state not simply as a means to secure intelligence about imminent 
threats, but also as a means of undermining the morale of the leaders and supporters of 
oppositional groups by spreading widespread fear, then torture clearly becomes a tool of state 
terrorism. It is important to note that even when states try to hide their involvement in 
civilian-directed violence such as torture from external audiences, they are still sending a 
powerful message to the local society or social groups they wish to intimidate. In the use of 
torture, this is achieved in part by transforming damaged victims into a symbolic message for 
the target group (Cohen and Corrado 2005, p. 107) – a case of instrumentalising individuals 
for the purposes of intimidating an audience. The use of disappearances as a strategy of 
terrorism similarly sends a symbolic message that the state is omnipotent, omnipresent, and 
utterly ruthless in dealing with its opponents. Crucially, it is important to note that state 
terrorism may have both instrumental (terroristic) and strategic intentions: killing a popular 
and effective union organiser for example, both weakens the union in the immediate term and 
sends a message to future union leaders and the social groups they come from. 
Other state practices which fall under the definition of terrorism include the „terror 
bombing‟ of civilian areas during wartime to intimidate the population into submission or 
terrify them into putting pressure on their leaders, particularly when the city is chosen 
randomly (as a result of favourable weather conditions on the day, for example) and the 
bombing itself brings no discernible strategic advantage. Under this understanding, certain  
doctrines of strategic bombing, such as „shock and awe‟, as well as certain contemporary 
practices such as the widespread targeting of civilian areas in Israel‟s 2006 bombing of South 
Lebanon and NATO‟s bombing of civilian targets during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, clearly 
fall within the definition of terrorism.
6
 These are all cases of frightening one group of people 
in order to produce a political change in another, which is the essence of the terrorism tactic. 
State counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency can also become terrorism when it fails to 
distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, it is highly disproportionate, and it aims to 
terrify or intimidate the wider population or a particular community into submission (Goodin 
2006, pp. 69-73). Lastly, it can be argued quite persuasively that state doctrines and practices 
of „nuclear deterrence‟, „coercive diplomacy‟ (see Stohl 1988, George 1971), „constructive 
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 Beau Grosscup (2006) provides a convincing and eloquent argument about why the doctrine and practice of 
strategic bombing is a form of state terrorism – not least because its original formulation was as „terror 
bombing‟ aimed at civilians and intended „to create such terror, destruction and misery as to undermine 
civilians‟ morale and in swift order break their fragile will to resist‟ (p. 24). 
9 
 
engagement‟,7 sanctions,8 and certain peace settlements involving making pacts with groups 
who have engaged in the widespread use of terror,
9
 can also constitute state terrorism. 
The counter-argument by many terrorism scholars is that the state‟s use of terror may 
have some similarities to non-state terrorism but is fundamentally different because states 
have different aims and methods. This is an unconvincing argument, however. In the first 
place, terrorism has always been used to pursue a variety of aims, both revolutionary and 
conservative. State terrorism may be aimed at engendering a political and social revolution, 
such as the terror employed by the Pol Pot, Stalinist, and Nazi regimes; alternately, it may be 
aimed at preserving the power of the regime and ensuring a continuation of the status quo, 
such as the terror of many Latin American dictatorships during the cold war. In most cases, 
state terrorism is aimed at terrorising the population in the short-term in order to ensure 
continued political control in the long-term. States often employ terrorism when they lack the 
normative political means of ensuring control (Gibbs 1989, pp. 338-39). In the same way, 
non-state terrorist groups also pursue revolutionary or conservative aims. Second, states may 
have access to more destructive means of violence, but this does not means that the violence 
is qualitatively different; it is still directed at civilians and employed symbolically to 
influence an audience. In any case, the empirical record demonstrates that state terrorism 
most often employs exactly the same methods – bombings, assassinations, kidnap, torture, 
and the like – as non-state terrorist groups, even if they can be used more widely and 
frequently by state actors.    
A second important criticism that can be levelled at the field for upholding its silences 
on state terrorism is that by any empirical measure, states have engaged in far more terrorism 
than non-state terrorists and their terrorism has been far more serious and destructive. This is 
not surprising, as states possess far more destructive power than non-state actors and the use 
of terrorism can become institutionalised in permanent state structures. In addition, there is a 
great deal of evidence of Western state involvement in terrorism. As a very crude 
comparison, non-state terrorism is responsible for between a few hundred and a few thousand 
deaths annually over the entire world, depending upon which data set or measures are 
employed. By contrast, states have killed, tortured, and intimidated hundreds of millions of 
people over the past century or so (see Rummel 1994, Sluka 200b), and a great many states 
continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, 
Uzbekistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Tibet, North Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Sudan, and elsewhere. Many of these states regularly employ extensive state torture, extra-
judicial killings, disappearances, collective punishments, and daily forms of violent 
intimidation to terrorise opponents and enforce compliance to state rule; human rights groups 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch provide meticulous and continual 
documentation of these violations. The point is that even if only a small fraction of these 
murders and acts of civilian-directed violence can be identified analytically as acts of state 
terrorism, they would still vastly outnumber the annual acts of non-state terrorism.  
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9
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Similarly, Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, 
which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the 
U.S. and other colonial powers as a form of governance and social control in numerous 
countries throughout the colonial period;
10
 the „terror bombings‟ of civilians during World 
War II and other campaigns; U.S. and Western support and sanctuary for a range of right-
wing insurgent groups during the cold war such as anti-Castro groups, the Contras, Unita, the 
Mujahideen, and others – groups which regularly committed terrorist acts including planting 
car bombs in markets, kidnappings, assassinations, civilian massacres, and blowing up 
civilian airliners;
11
 Israel‟s extensive use of state terrorism in the form of torture, extra-
judicial assassination, and collective punishments against Palestinian populations in 
surrounding countries and within the occupied territories; Israeli sponsorship of Christian 
militia groups in Lebanon who engaged in numerous acts of terror during the 1980s, 
including the notorious Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres; U.S. tolerance of Irish 
Republican terrorist activity in the U.S. (see Byman 2005, pp. 21-27); U.S. and Western 
support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps 
most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran – often under the cover 
of „counter-terrorism‟ programmes (see Harman 1982, Herman and O‟Sullivan 1989, Gareau 
2004); U.S. use of terrorism during counter-insurgency operations such as „Operation 
Phoenix‟ in Vietnam, and in counter-revolutionary campaigns in Latin America such as 
„Operation Condor‟ (see McSherry 2002); British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern 
Ireland (see Sluka 2000c) and various other „Islamist‟ groups in Libya and Bosnia, among 
others;
12
 Spanish state terror during the so-called „dirty war‟ against ETA (see Aretxaga 
2000); French terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; 
Italian state sponsorship of right-wing terrorists who carried out so-called „black flag 
operations‟, such as terrorist bombings, designed to implicate left-wing groups from the late 
1960s to the early 1980s; Western support for Afghan (see Gareau 2004, pp. 199-200) and 
Somali warlords today; the provision of continuing sanctuary to anti-Castro terrorists (see 
Barker 2002, p. 75, Sanchez 2004), former Latin American state terrorists (Grann 2001), and 
various Asian anti-communist terrorist groups
13
 in the U.S. today; toleration and support for 
Pakistan, despite its continued sponsorship of Kashmiri terrorist groups (Dell 2002, p. 37); 
continuing U.S. and Western support for Colombian state terrorism (see Stokes 2004); the 
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extensive use of, and sponsorship of, torture and extraordinary rendition (Grey 2006) in the 
war on terror today; the toleration (or passive sponsorship) of death squad activity in 
occupied Iraq today (see Drefus 2005, Hersh 2005); among many other examples. 
The most important point to note about this extensive list of examples is that even if 
we were to restrict our understanding of terrorism to the actions typically employed by non-
state actors and we did not include broader forms of governance or state practices during war, 
we would still have to conclude that states engage in a tremendous amount of terrorism, most 
of which is never subject to systematic evaluation in the broader terrorism studies literature. 
Similarly, even by Western democratic measures and understandings of „state sponsorship of 
terrorism‟, it is clear that Western sponsorship of terrorism is as long-running and extensive 
as many of the cases described in the U.S. State Department‟s annual list of offending 
nations. In short, using the very same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology, and 
empirical categories that are employed by terrorism studies scholars reveals that states, 
including Western democratic states, employ terrorism too. The puzzle therefore is why are 
such obvious cases of terrorism so rarely studied by terrorism scholars? 
The purpose of a first order critique is not necessarily to establish the full and final 
truth about terrorism and the role of states in it. Rather, first order critique aims to destabilise 
dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the 
field, and suggest that other ways of understanding, conceptualising, and studying the subject 
– other ways of knowing – are possible. In this case, I have attempted to destabilise dominant 
understandings of terrorism as solely an activity of non-state actors and reveal how states, 
including Western democratic states currently involved in fighting a „war on terrorism‟, 
regularly employ the tactic of terrorism themselves. This critique destabilises the dominant 
knowledge and practice of terrorism scholars who primarily focus on examples of non-state 
terrorism as an object of study or limit their analysis of state sponsors of terrorism to non-
Western states. This kind of critical destabilisation is crucial for opening up the space needed 
to ask new kinds of questions and seek new forms of knowledge. 
 
Second order critique 
In contrast to first order critique, second order critique involves the adoption of a critical 
standpoint outside of the discourse. In this case, based on an understanding of discourse as 
socially productive or constitutive, and fully cognisant of the knowledge-power nexus, a 
second order critique attempts to expose the political functions and ideological consequences 
of the particular forms of representation enunciated by the discourse. In this case, we want to 
try and understand what some of the political effects and consequences of the silences of state 
terrorism are. A number of such effects can be identified. 
 First, the discourse naturalises a particular understanding of what terrorism is, namely, 
a form of illegitimate non-state violence. Such an understanding of terrorism functions to 
restrict the scholarly viewpoint to one set of actors and to particular kinds of actions, and 
functions to distract and obscure other actors and actions which should be named and studied 
as „terrorism‟. It also narrows the possibilities for understanding terrorism within alternative 
paradigms, such as from the perspective of gender terrorism (see Sharlach 2008). In other 
words, it has a restrictive and distorting effect within the field of knowledge which gives the 
impression that terrorism studies is more of a narrow extension of counter-insurgency or 
national security studies than an open and inclusive domain of research into all forms and 
aspects of terrorism. Consequently, Andrew Silke (2001) concludes that terrorism studies „is 
largely driven by policy concerns‟ and „largely limited to government agendas‟ (p. 2).  
In addition, the broader academic, social, and cultural influence of terrorism studies 
(through the authority and legitimacy provided by „terrorism experts‟ to the media and as 
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policy advisers, for example), means that this restrictive viewpoint is diffused to the broader 
society, which in turn generates its own ideological effects. Specifically, the distorted focus 
on non-state terrorism functions to reify state perspectives and priorities, and reinforce a 
state-centric, problem-solving paradigm of politics in which „terrorism‟ is viewed as an 
identifiable social or individual problem in need of solving by the state, and not as a practice 
of state power, for example. From this perspective, it functions to maintain the legitimacy of 
state uses of violence and delegitimize all forms of non-state violence (which has its own 
ideological effects and is problematic in a number of obvious ways). This fundamental belief 
in the instrumental rationality of political violence as an effective and legitimate tool of the 
state is open to a great many criticisms, not least that it provides the normative basis from 
which non-state terrorist groups frequently justify their own (often well-intentioned) violence 
(see Burke 2008, Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). There is from this viewpoint an ethical 
imperative to try and undermine the widespread acceptance that political violence is a mostly 
legitimate and effective option in resolving conflict – for either state or non-state actors. 
Political violence is in fact, a moral and physical disaster in the vast majority of cases. 
From an ethical-normative perspective, such a restricted understanding of terrorism 
also functions to obscure and silence the voices and perspectives of those who live in 
conditions of daily terror from the random and arbitrary violence of their own governments, 
some of whom are supported by Western states. At the present juncture, it also functions to 
silence the voices of those who experience Western policies – directly, as in those tortured in 
the war on terror, and indirectly, as in those suffering under Western-supported regimes – as 
a form of terrorism. That is, it deflects and diverts attention from the much greater state 
terrorism which blights the lives of tens of millions of people around the world today.  
 Related to these broader normative and ideological effects, the treatment of state 
terrorism within the discourse – the silences on it and the narrow construction of „state-
sponsored terrorism‟ – also functions to position state terrorism (should it even exist within 
the dominant framework) as seemingly less important than non-state terrorism, and as 
confined to the actions that states take in support of non-state terrorism. This also distorts the 
field of knowledge and political practice by suggesting that the sponsorship of Palestinian 
groups by Iran for example, is an infinitely more serious and dangerous problem than the fact 
that millions of Colombians, Uzbeks, Zimbabweans, and so on, are daily terrorised by death 
squads, state torture, and serious human rights abuses. Within this discursive terrain, it can 
also function to provide legitimacy to Western policies such as sanctions, coercive 
diplomacy, and pre-emptive war against politically determined „state-sponsors of terrorism‟ 
which may be terroristic themselves, and which ignore the involvement in state-sponsorship 
by Western states.   
 From a political-normative viewpoint, the silence on state terrorism, and in particular 
the argument of many terrorism scholars that state actions can never be defined as 
„terrorism‟, actually functions to furnish states with a rhetorical justification for using what 
may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens without fear 
of condemnation. In effect, it provides them with greater leeway for applying terror-based 
forms of violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by many states such as Israel, Russia, 
China, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, and others who try to intimidate groups with the application 
of massive and disproportionate state violence. From this perspective, a discourse which 
occludes and obscures the very possibility of state terrorism can be considered part of the 
conditions that actually makes state terrorism possible. In addition, the silence on state 
terrorism within the field also functions to undermine the political struggle of human rights 
activists against the use of terror by states by disallowing the delegitimizing power and 
resources that come from describing state actions as „terrorism‟. It is pertinent to note in this 
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context that the world‟s leading states have continually rejected any and all attempts to 
legally define and proscribe a category of actions which would be called „state terrorism‟, 
arguing instead that such actions are already covered by other laws such as the laws of war 
(see Becker 2006). 
The silence on state terrorism has another political effect, namely, the way in which it 
has functioned, and continues to function, to distract from and deny the long history of 
Western involvement in terrorism, thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially 
benign – rather than aimed at reifying existing structures of power and domination in the 
international system, for example. That is, by preventing the effective criticism of particular 
Western policies it works to maintain the dangerous myth of Western exceptionalism. This 
sense of exceptionalism and the supportive discourse of terrorism studies permits Western 
states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete political projects and partisan interests 
aimed at maintaining international dominance. For example, by reinforcing the notion that 
non-state terrorism is a much greater threat and problem than state terrorism and by obscuring 
the ways in which counter-terrorism can morph into state terrorism, the discourse functions to 
legitimise the current war on terror and its associated policies of military intervention, 
extraordinary rendition, reinforcement of the national security state, and the like. More 
specifically, the discourse can provide legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or counter-
terrorism programmes where the actual aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-
economic order such as is occurring in Colombia at present (see Stokes 2006). Importantly, 
the silence on state terrorism also functions to de-legitimise all forms of violent counter-
hegemonic or revolutionary struggle (by maintaining the notion that state violence is 
automatically legitimate and all non-state violence is inherently illegitimate), thereby 
maintaining the liberal international order and many oppressive international power structures 
(see also Duffield 2001). Lastly, the discourse can be used to selectively justify particular 
projects of regime change,
14
 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military 
occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved 
political movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah.  
In the end, the discourse functions to permit the reification and extension of state 
hegemony both internationally and domestically, and perhaps more importantly, the belief in 
the instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics. Despite the intentions 
of terrorism scholars therefore, who may feel that they engage in objective academic analysis 
of a clearly defined phenomenon, the discourse actually serves a number of distinctly 
political purposes and has several important ideological consequences for society. 
 
Conclusion 
As noted above, there is a real puzzle revealed through this analysis, namely, why there is 
such a deep and pervasive silence on state terrorism within the discourse, especially given the 
genealogical origins of the term and the mountain of empirical examples of the phenomenon? 
There are a number of likely answers to this puzzle. In the first place, there may be cases in 
which scholars have been co-opted through various means into state perspectives and 
projects. Given the benefits that can accrue from close association with state power, it is not 
surprising that some scholars choose to participate directly in such projects. Related to this, 
some scholars may be intimidated by state power, fearing the ways in which state officials 
and state apologists can punish and harm scholars who apply the term „terrorism‟ to state 
actions. This could be a major reason why the silence on Israeli state terrorism is so 
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pervasive. In the U.S. at least, scholars who criticise Israeli policies in public are regularly 
attacked and intimidated as anti-Semitic. Alternately, many scholars who joined the field 
following the terrorist attacks in 2001 did so out of a genuine desire to work with the U.S. 
government to prevent further occurrences of such atrocities.  
Another reason is likely to be simply the failure of academic procedure and scholarly 
reflection – the failure to interrogate and question the assumptions and accepted knowledge 
of the field. This is related to a broader process of socialisation into the accepted discourse 
and practices of the field; scholars are trained into viewing terrorism in a particular light. 
Related to this, most scholars feel an inherent affinity to the values and interests of their own 
societies, which may make facing the reality of their government‟s involvement in terrorist 
atrocities difficult and disturbing. Finally, it may be related to the inherent difficulties 
involved in studying state terrorism: not only is obtaining primary data a challenging 
exercise, especially in cases where state agents may want to prevent potentially damaging 
international publicity, but a great deal of conceptual and theoretical work often has to be 
done to determine which acts constitute state terrorism (Blakeley forthcoming). 
 In the end however, the puzzle of why state terrorism has been so neglected in the 
field is less important than recognising that there are important reasons for „bringing the state 
back into terrorism studies‟ (Blakeley 2007). First, there are obvious analytical reasons for 
taking state terrorism seriously, including the imbalances and distortions which a narrow 
focus on non-state terrorism introduces. Second, there are normative reasons for studying 
state terrorism in a rigorous and systematic manner, notably that such knowledge furnishes a 
powerful means of holding states to account for their actions and reinforcing norms of 
behaviour that exclude the use of violence to intimidate and terrorise civilians. By any 
measure, states have been responsible for infinitely more human suffering and terror than any 
other actor; the promotion of human security therefore depends on protecting citizens from 
the abuses and predations of states.  
In conclusion, exposing the ideological effects and political technologies of the 
discourse has the potential to open up critical space for the articulation of alternative and 
potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. The good news is that discourses 
are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-hegemonic struggle and 
subversive forms of knowledge. In this case, not only is the discourse inherently unstable and 
vulnerable to different forms of critique, but the continual setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
ongoing revelations of state torture and rendition by Western forces, and increasing resistance 
to government attempts to restrict civil liberties suggest that the present juncture provides an 
opportune moment to engage in deliberate and sustained critique of a dominant discourse 
which focuses on non-state actors and obscures the much greater terrorism of state actors. 
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